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WHY JUSTICE DOES NOT PAY IN PLATO’S
REPUBLIC
It is generally recognized that, in the Republic, Plato faces a difficulty in reconciling
his requirements for good government with the main thesis of the dialogue. The main
argument  is devoted  to  answering Glaucon and Adeimantus, who question the
rationality of just behaviour on the ground that such behaviour is against one’s
self-interest. All assume that it is rational to be just only if it is in one’s self-interest to
be just, and that it is in an agent’s self-interest to be just only if just behaviour is
something that is good in itself for the agent. The dialogue’s primary aim is to
establish that it is indeed in one’s self-interest to be just because justice is an intrinsic
good.
In Plato’s ideal city, justice demands that the philosopher perform the task of ruling.
According to the overall thesis of the dialogue—justice pays—it should follow that it is
in the self-interest of the philosopher to rule. But Plato also thinks that whenever
people with access to political power believe that they themselves benefit by ruling,
good government is impossible. For then it is inevitable, in Plato’s opinion, that conflict
and disunity will arise in the city as a result of different people or factions competing
for power. So it is fundamental to the Republic’s political philosophy that those who
rule regard ruling as something that is not in their self-interest, as something that is evil
rather than good for themselves. The present paper will argue that this essential
requirement for the government of the ideal city is clearly present in the Republic: the
philosopher-kings rightly regard ruling as an intrinsic evil. But then in this case, a very
important case, Plato’s argument that justice is in one’s self-interest breaks down.1
While the problem created by the case of the philosopher is generally recognized, I
will argue further that Plato faces another serious problem that has not been
recognized: for all, or almost all, members of Plato’s ideal polis, when justice is a
matter of doing one’s job, justice does not pay.
I. WHAT PLATO MUST PROVE
1. Justice is good in itself
Plato’s argument begins in Book II with a classification of goods into (1) those that
are good in themselves but not for their consequences, (2) those that are good both in
themselves and for their consequences, and (3) those that are evil in themselves2 but
good for their consequences.
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1 Many have laboured to exonerate Plato by claiming that he does, or could, affirm that ruling
is in the philosophers’ self-interest. Others regard it as a mistake to think that Plato believes that
all rational just actions must bein theagent’s self-interest. I believe that these views are wrongbut,
apart from discussion of a few points, I cannot consider them here.
2 One point that proves that goods in the third class are evil in themselves is that they are
described as in themselves ‘to be avoided’( α υ  δι  α υ  ζεφλυ οξ) (358a). Only something
intrinsically evil could be something that is in itself to be avoided. And since goods of the third
class are good because of their consequences it cannot be in virtue of their consequences that they
are to be avoided.
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Glaucon and Adeimantus, cannot be a disagreement about the value of the
consequences of justice and injustice since everyone agrees that the consequences of
injustice are evil and the consequences of justice are good. Socrates affirms that justice
belongs to the second class of goods, whereas the many claim that justice belongs to
the third class of goods (358a). Since members of the third class—like members of the
second class—have good consequences, the many agree with Socrates that justice has
good consequences. The many also agree that the consequences of injustice are evil.
This agreement is presupposed in Glaucon’s setting up of the question which the
Republic is supposed to answer. For in order to focus on the worth of  justice and
injustice themselves he considers a case where the consequences of justice are given to
the unjust man and the consequences of injustice are given to the just man (361a–d).
And the consequences of justice are all good (362b–c; cf. 363a–d) and the
consequences of injustice are all evil (361e–362a; cf. 363d–e). Glaucon is setting out
the  view  of the  many,  so the many as well as Plato accept  the  point  that  the
consequences of injustice are evil. Similarly, in Adeimantus’ speech the many are said
to blame injustice (363d–e; cf. 367b–c) because of its evil consequences, in particular
punishment.3
Thus, at Republic 612, at the close of the part of his argument which ignores the
consequences of justice and injustice, Socrates describes what he has done in these
terms:
I yielded . . . [to the ‘request that the just man should be reputed unjust, and the unjust man
just’] for the sake of the argument, so that justice itself could be judged in relation to injustice
itself. (612c–d)
4
Hence, since the issue is solely a disagreement over the intrinsic goodness and evil of
justice and injustice, Plato’s argument that justice pays will fail if he must concede
that justice is an intrinsic evil.5
2. Just action is good in itself
The many, in claiming that injustice pays and justice does not pay, are concerned
above all with just and unjust actions. Consider the speech of Glaucon. The many are
said to hold that ‘to do injustice (υ  2διλε ξ) is by nature good’ (358e3), not that the
state of injustice in the soul is a good. When Glaucon explains their account of the
origin of justice (358e–359b), it is an account of why people agree to behave justly,
not an account of why they agree to be in a certain soul state. Next, he argues, not
that certain people are in a certain soul state unwillingly, but that all who behave
justly do so unwillingly, using the example of the man with the ring of Gyges who
performs many unjust actions for his own benefit (359b–c). Finally, there is an
argument that the life of the unjust is better than the life of the just (360e–362c), and
the unjust man is above all the man who has committed unjust acts and the man who
is just is the man who acts justly. In this part of Glaucon’s speech, the man who is
3 Although the many claim that injustice pays, their claim is that injustice pays only in the
unusual circumstances in which the consequences of injustice can be avoided, since the evil of
those consequences when not avoided outweighs what they regard as the intrinsic good of
injustice. This, together with their belief that those evil consequences of injusticecannot normally
be avoided, explains why they agree to the social contract (358e–359b).
4 Cf. 612a–b. Translations are based on the translation of G. M. A. Grube, Plato: The Republic
(London, 1981).
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done (cf. 392b). When his injustice becomes public  and he needs to resort  to
persuasion or force to avoid the consequences, what has become public is not a state
of his soul but his unjust actions. Likewise the man who is just but has the reputation
for injustice is the man who has the reputation for wrongdoing despite having done
nothing unjust, not the man who is in a certain soul state but has the reputation for
being in the contrary soul state. Similar remarks apply to the speech of Adeimantus.
So the question about justice and injustice raised by Glaucon which Socrates must
answer applies above all to behaviour. This is explicit in the formulation of the
question of whether justice pays at 444e–445a:
It is left for us to enquire, it seems, if it is more profitable to act justly (δ λαια πσ0υυειξ), to
engage in fine pursuits and be just, whether one is known to be so or not, or to do wrong
(2διλε ξ) and be unjust, provided one does not pay the penalty and is not improved by
punishment. (cf. 588b with its clear reference back to Book II)
Since Plato must demonstrate that justice is good in itself, we can now say that he
must show that just behaviour is good in itself.6 Thus, the dialogue closes (621c5–6)
with Plato asserting that all will be well with us if we strive in every way to act with
justice and intelligence.
II. THE INTRINSIC GOODNESS OF JUST ACTION AND THE PROBLEM
OF RULING
Plato addresses the question of the intrinsic value of just and unjust actions at
443e–445b and 588b–591e, where he claims that just actions promote justice in the
soul and unjust actions promote injustice in the soul.7 Since 612a–b describes the
argument up to that point as a demonstration that justice itself8 is good and injustice
itself is evil, 443e–445b and 588b–591e are meant to establish that just action is good
in itself and unjust action is evil in itself.9 Plato has argued that justice in the soul is
good in itself and injustice in the soul is evil in itself. Now, at 443e–445b and
588b–591e, Plato argues that just behaviour causes justice in the soul, and unjust
behaviour causes injustice in the soul, and he understands this to show that just
behaviour is good in itself and unjust behaviour is evil in itself.10
But since Plato considers ruling evil in itself, it appears that the philosophers,
5 Cf. SimonH. Aronson,‘Thehappy philosopher—acounterexampleto Plato’s proof’,Journal
of the History of Philosophy 10 (1972), 383–98, at 385; C. Kirwan, ‘Glaucon’s challenge’,
Phronesis 10 (1965), 162–73, at 171–2.
6 Likewise, when Plato turns to discussing the consequences of justice and injustice as opposed
to their intrinsic value (612a–614a), the good consequences follow for those who behave justly
(612b3–4, 613a8–b1, c5–6, 615b6–c4, 621c7–d1) while the bad consequences follow for those who
behave unjustly (615a5–b6, 615c2–616b1, 619a3–5). The punishments in this life for injustice
which is not successfully hidden (613d–e) result from others’ awareness of a person’s unjust acts,
not from their awareness of the state of a person’s soul (cf. 613a1–2).
7 The assumption that injustice in the soul is caused by unjust actions is also made by
Adeimantus at 366e–367a. Cf. Cri. 47d–48a, 49b, Grg. 503c–d, Tht. 176e–177a, Leg. 726a–728c.
8 This at least includes just action—612b3–5.
9 In ‘Plato’s division of goods in the Republic’, Phronesis 47 (2002), 309–35 I argue that Plato
regards the causal consequences of justice or injustice that are independent of the reputation for
justice or injustice as possibly relevant to their intrinsic goodness and evil.
10 Thus, David Sachs was wrong to claim that Plato’s response to Glaucon’s challenge is
irrelevant in limiting itself to showing the good effects of a just soul (‘A fallacy in Plato’s
Republic’, Philosophical Review 72 [1963], 141–58).
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So in this most crucial case of just behaviour justice does not pay, contrary to the main
thesis of the dialogue.
The Republic twice discusses the question of whether the philosopher-rulers could
have a better life than the one they will get in theideal polis. At 419a Adeimantusraises
the question on the grounds that, although the philosophers are in control of the city,
as a result of Plato’s ban on their right to own private property, they do not own
money, land, or fine homes with elegant furnishings.
Socrates’immediate answeris that thecity canexist only if essential publicfunctions
are carried out, and citizens are not to be given anything that threatens their ability to
carry out their tasks as well as possible. Socrates had just pointed out (417a–b) that if
the rulers are allowed to own money and private property, they will be rendered unfit
for the job of ruling:
If they themselves acquire private land and houses and money, they will be household managers
and farmers instead of guardians, hostile masters of the other citizens instead of their allies;
they will spend their whole life hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, and
they will rush themselves and their city very close to ruin.
This is the justification for Plato’s well-known adoption of communism for the ruling
class.
Later (465e–466c), Socrates returns to Adeimantus’  challenge and rejects its
‘adolescent’view of happiness. With regard to that alternative life—the lifeof accumu-
lation of money and property—Socrates affirms that the life of the philosopher is far
superior. So the philosophers do act in their self-interest in refraining from what would
be for them the unjust acquisition of property.
But Glaucon’s question at 519d raises a significantly different case. For there the
alternative to the life of ruling open to the philosophers is not some misguided view
of happiness but Plato’s own view of a supremely happy life—the life devoted to
contemplation of the Forms.
Glaucon asks (519d8–9) whether we are to do the philosophers ‘an injustice and
make them live worse when they could live better’. Glaucon’s question implies two
claims: (1) we are doing the philosophers an injustice, and (2) we are making the
philosophers live a worse life when a better one is open to them; and (2) appears to be
the basis for (1). Socrates’ reply concedes (2) but denies that (1) follows from (2), and
argues that (2) is necessary if there is to be any possibility of good government.
(1) We are not doing the philosophers an injustice. Unlike in other cities, in Plato’s
city the philosophers have been nourished and brought up by the city, and hence they
owe something to the city that justice requires to be repaid (520a–c).
(2) The philosophers can be excellent rulers only because there is a life better than
the life of ruling which they prefer to the life of ruling (520e4–521a1): ‘If [and
evidently only if] you can find a life better than ruling for those who are about to rule,
it is possible for a well-governed city to come to be for you.’
When Socrates responds to Glaucon’s question, he is using the term ‘life’ in such a
way that one person can share in more than one such life (520b7–c1, 521b1–10): those
who rule, and thus have a political life, will at the same time actually have a better life
which they pursue at other times—the life of philosophy. Having their own private
goodsindependently of the political life, the philosophers will not be tempted to secure
their good from the possession of political power. Hence, they will have no desire to
382 R. HEINAMANrule in their own interest instead of the interest of the whole city, and they will not be
tempted to compete with others for political power.
Nevertheless, if the life of philosophy, so understood, is better than the life of
ruling, it also appears that—other things being equal—someone who could devote
the whole of their life to philosophy would be better off than someone who must take
time off from philosophy to do other things. And Plato’s guardians must take a great
deal of time off from philosophy. For, even if they spend most of their time engaged in
philosophy after taking up their duties as guardians at the age of fifty, their preceding
twenty years would have involved five years of study and fifteen years of adminis-
trative work (539d–540b). Since ruling is the sort of work that the philosophers despise
(521b),11 such administrative work must rank even lower in their eyes.
Here is what the Republic says about the value of ruling, the philosophers’ attitude
to it, and why it is essential for the philosophers to be reluctant to rule:
A. The value of ruling
1. Ruling is neither good nor fine (347d12 [cf. 520c–d, e], 540b).
2. Ruling is an evil (520d–521b).
3. Ruling is not something that is enjoyed (347d).
4. Ruling is a laborious task (π ξοΚ) (519d, 520b, d, 540b).
5. Ruling is difficult (551c10).
B. The attitude of the philosophers to ruling
6. The philosophers view ruling as neither good nor fine (347d [cf. 520c–d, e], 540b).
7. The philosophers view ruling as a great evil (520d–521b).
8. Ruling is seen as something necessary (347d, 520e, 540b).
9. The philosophers will despise political rule (521b [cf. 496b]).
10. To rule is to go down into the cave (519d), turning from the contemplation of
divine entities to deal with merely human affairs (517d).
11. The philosophers are not lovers of ruling (521b).
12. The philosophers are less eager to rule than any other rulers (520d).
13. The philosophers do not wish to participate in human affairs but to contemplate
the Forms (517c–d, 519d, 520d2–4).
14. The philosophers do not rule willingly (519c; cf. 499b2–6). (That rulers rule
willingly is the thesis of Thrasymachus [345e], and Socrates argues that the
claim is false in the case of true rulers [345e–347a]).
15. To willingly seek to rule without being compelled is shameful (347c).
16. In a city of good men, they will compete with each other to avoid ruling
(347c–d).
17. The philosophers are compelled to rule (347c, 421b–c, 519e, 520a, 521b).
18. The true ruler does not seek his own advantage in ruling but the advantage of
the ruled (347d, 521a).
11 It is the same word—λαυαζσοξε ξ—that Plato uses to describe the philosopher’s attitude to
ruling and the educated man’s proper attitude to slaves (549a2).
12 If anyone objects to the use of Book I, the reply is that the references show that Book I
differs not at all from the rest of the dialogue in its view of ruling.
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19. In  cities in which the  rulers seek their  own private good from  ruling, the
government is fought over with discord as the result (521a).
20. In any city in which ruling is considered a good, disunity, civil strife and the
destruction of the city will result (520c–521a).
21. Any city with rulers who are most eager to rule will receive the worst rule
(520d4).
22. It is possible to have a well governed polis only if the rulers know a better life
than ruling (520e–521a). There is one life that is better than ruling, the life of
philosophy (519d, 520e–521b). The education of the future guardians is
introduced precisely as aiming at the production of people who will know of a
better life than ruling in order to prevent disunity arising in the city (521a–c).
Except for (2) and (7), all of these statements are explicit. But the following shows
that they too are accepted in the Republic.
At 540b4–5 Plato says that the philosophers will undertake to rule but rule ‘not as
something fine but as something necessary’ (ο γ  Κ λαµ ξ υι 2µµ   Κ 2ξαηλα οξ
πσ0υυοξυαΚ). This seems to suggest that the philosophers will not love ruling and do it
unwillingly. Vernezze and Brickhouse deny this and say that Plato means only that the
philosophers will approach ruling as a moral requirement, or as a duty.13 But this
cannot be right.
First consider two previous passages where, as in 540b, Plato speaks of people doing
what they regard as necessary. Glaucon’s second thesis is that
all who practise justice do so unwillingly as something necessary but not good (4λοξυεΚ
 πιυθδε οφτιξ  Κ 2ξαηλα οξ 2µµ  ο γ  Κ 2ηαρ ξ). (358c3–4; cf. 360c6–7)
At 347c–d, after saying that necessity and punishment must be laid upon good men to
convince them to wish to rule, Plato says
. . . to willingly approach ruling rather than wait for necessity (υ   λ ξυα  π  υ  4σγειξ   ξαι
2µµ1 ν  2ξ0ηλθξ πεσιν ξειξ) is thought shameful. Now the worst punishment is to be ruled by
a worse man than oneself if one does not wish to rule. I think it is the fear of this which makes
men of good character rule whenever they do. They approach ruling not as something good or
something to be enjoyed, but as something necessary ( σγοξυαι  π  υ  4σγειξ ο γ  Κ  π 
2ηαρ ξ υι   ξυεΚ ο δ   Κ ε παρ τοξυεΚ  ξ α υ ! 2µµ   Κ  π  2ξαηλα οξ).
When 358c says that the many do what is just not because they regard it as good but
because they regard it as necessary, this plainly does not mean that they do it because
they regard it as a moral duty. Rather, as 360c indicates (cf. 359c), it is necessary in
that if they acted unjustly, they would be punished for violating the law. So the just
action, though evil in itself, is necessary in order to avoid a greater evil. The same
notion of an action’s being necessary is present in 347c–d as well: ruling is necessary
for the men of good character because, though evil in itself, it is necessary to avoid the
‘punishment’ of being ruled by inferior men. In both passages, then, a ‘necessary’
13 P. Vernezze, ‘The philosopher’s interest’, in N. Smith (ed.), Plato: Critical Assessments
(London, 1998), 153–73, at 158. T. Brickhouse, ‘The paradox of the philosopher’s rule’, in Smith,
Plato: Critical Assessment, 141–52, at 149–50. Cf. T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 299;
R. Kraut, ‘Return to the cave, Republic 519–21’, in J. Cleary and W. Wians (edd.), Proceedings of
the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (Boston, 1996), 43–62, at 47.
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to avoid a greater evil.
Now consider how Plato describes the attitude of the philosophers and
non-philosophers to the task of ruling:
With the philosophers in power, ‘the city will be governed as a waking reality and not as in a
dream, as the majority of cities are now governed by men who are fighting shadows and striving
against each other in order to rule, as if this were a great good’ (τυατια  ξυψξ πεσ  υο 
4σγειξ ο λο ξυαι!  Κ νεη0µοφ υιξ Κ 2ηαρο   ξυοΚ). (520c6–d1)
Each of [the philosophers] will approach ruling as something necessary, in a manner opposite to
that of present day rulers in each city ( Κ  π  2ξαηλα οξ α υ ξ  λατυοΚ ε τι υ  4σγειξ!
υο ξαξυ οξ υ ξ ξ ξ  ξ  λ0τυ  π µει 2σγ ξυψξ). (520e2–3)
They will spend much of their time with philosophy, but when their turn comes, they will labour
( πιυαµαιπψσο ξυαΚ) and rule in political affairs, and they will do this not as something fine
(λαµ ξ) but as something necessary. (540b2–5)
In 520e Plato says that the philosophers ‘will approach ruling as something
necessary’, and then he explains this by adding that they approach it ‘in a manner
opposite to that of present day rulers in each city’. How do present-day rulers
approach ruling? It is explained a few lines earlier at 520c–d: they approach ruling ‘as
a great good’.14 So
(i) In approaching ruling as a necessity, the philosophers approach ruling in the way
opposite to the way in which present-day rulers approach ruling, and
(ii) Present-day rulers approach ruling as a great good.
Since the opposite of a great good is a great evil, when Plato says that the
philosophers approach ruling as a necessity and in a manner opposite to that of
present-day rulers, he means that they approach it as a great evil—(7)—which,
nevertheless, they must do.15 And since the philosophers have knowledge, ruling is an
evil—(2).
Further support for (2) and (7) is  provided by comparing the characteristics
attributed to ruling with the attitude of the many to justice:
23. Justice is laborious ( π ποξοΚ) (357c, 358a, 364a; cf. 365b6).
24. Justice is approached not as a good but as a necessity (358c).
25. Justice is evil in itself (358a).
26. Justice is difficult (358a, 364a; cf. 364d2–3).
27. Justice is done unwillingly (358c, 359b, 360c, 366d).
28. Justice is to be fled (ζεφλυ οξ—358a).
29. The many are compelled to do what is just (360c).
As (25) indicates, the many regard justice as evil in itself. Clearly, the fact that it is
laborious (23) is part of the explanation of why justice is regarded as evil in itself.
14 Cf. Thrasymachus’response at 345e2–4.
15 Note the same contrast between the necessary and the good in 358c3–4, 360c6–7, 347b9–d8,
and 540b2–5. Even if (i) and (ii) do not show that for ruling to be a ‘necessity’ consists in, or
includes, its being an evil, they still show that the philosophers’ attitude is the opposite of the
attitude which sees ruling as a good. That suffices to show that the philosophers see ruling as an
evil.
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γαµεπ ξ (26), which I have translated as ‘difficult’, but which might just as well be
translated as ‘grievous’, ‘painful’, ‘disagreeable’, ‘irksome’, or ‘hard to do’. In any
case, it matches (5)’s statement that ruling is difficult (551c10—γαµεπψυ0υθ).
Further, the philosophers approach ruling not as a good but as a necessity (6 and
8)—as the many approach justice not as a good but as a necessity (24). Plato regularly
connects the fact that an agent views an action as evil with the agent’s unwillingness to
do it, as he connects the fact that an agent views an action as good with the agent’s
willingness to do it.16 Thus, as the many are compelled to do what is just (29) and do so
unwillingly (27) because they see it as an evil, the philosophers are compelled to rule
(17) and do so unwillingly (13–16) because they see it as an evil. And as the many
regard justice as something to be fled (28), thephilosophersregard ruling as something
to be avoided (16).
Further evidence of the valuelessness of ruling for the philosopher can be found in
the cave analogy where Plato describes the attitude of the philosopher who has seen
the Form of the Good to those who remain behind in the cave (516d):
Do you think our man would desire those rewards [found in the cave] and envy those who were
honoured and held power among the prisoners, or would he feel, as Homer put it, that he
certainly wished to be ‘serf to another man without possessions upon the earth’and go through
any suffering, rather than share their opinions and live as they do.
As Grube points out,17 Plato’s reference is to the Odyssey (11, 489–90, quoted at Resp.
386c) where ‘Achilles says to Odysseus, on the latter’s visit to the underworld, that he
would rather be a servant to a poor man on earth than king among the dead.’
Obviously, the possession of political power is regarded as worthless by the
philosopher who has seen the Form of the Good.
The point that ruling is an intrinsic evil for the person who does it is crucial to the
government of the polis. Essential to the polis’unity is the avoidance of antagonism in
competition for political power. Such unity is possible only if the rulers would prefer
not to rule, and that reluctance is possible for the philosophers, who have knowledge,
only if ruling is indeed an evil rather than a benefit for themselves (19). If ruling were
an intrinsic good, the philosophers would end up fighting for political power with
resulting disunity for the city.
One might object that, even if ruling were an intrinsic good, the justice of the
philosophers would suffice to prevent any discord. After all, Plato does say that the
justice of the philosophers ensures that they will take on the burden of ruling despite
its disagreeableness (520d–e). If so, then if ruling were a positive good, their justice
should also ensure that in that case they would give it up when the time came to hand
over power.
But Plato cannot with consistency hold that disunity could be avoided even if the
16 Willingly xing:
(i) One believes that one will get some benefit from x (345e, 346e–347a, 399a–c, 412e–413a,
592a).
Unwillingly xing:
(i) One regards x as not a good for oneself (347c–d, 358c, 359a–b, 360c).
(ii) One regards x as an evil for oneself (381c, 382a, 399a–c, 412e–413a, 485c).
(iii) One regards x as a necessity (347c–d, 358c).
(iv) One is compelled (2ξαηλα  νεξοΚ) to x (360c).
17 Grube (n. 5), 195, n. 2.
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follow if the philosopher-rulers are allowed to own private property (417a–b):
When they themselves acquire private land and houses and money . . . they will be hostile
masters of the other citizens instead of their allies; they will spend their whole life hating and
being hated, plotting and being plotted against; they will be much more afraid of internal than
of external enemies, and they will rush themselves and their city very close to ruin.
Evidently the fact that the guardians are just does not suffice to prevent the sort of
conflict which Plato envisages if they are allowed to own private property.18
It is useless to suggest that, at 416–21, Plato is not yet assuming the degree of justice
in his rulers that he requires later, and once that level of justice is attained the problem
disappears. For Plato is already assuming that the rulers have received the best possible
education (416b), even if he only specifies its content later, and he says (416b) that such
an education would be the best security against the rulers abusing the citizens under
their control.
Further, if the suggestion were correct, there would be no reason for Plato to retain
the law that the rulers cannot own private property as part of the constitution. But it is
perfectly clear that the ban on the ownership of private property remains a fixed part
of the constitution (464b–e, 465c–466a, 543b–c; cf. Ti. 18b).
The fact is that the position would be even worse in the case of ruling than in the
case of private property if ruling were an intrinsic good. As philosophersthe rulerswill
understand the trueworth of things and sowill recognize that thepossessionof private
property is of no importance for a good life (465e–466c, 485d–e). Nevertheless, despite
this knowledge, Plato fears that if they acquired such property there would be a serious
possibility that the philosophers would be corrupted.
Now suppose that political rule were an intrinsic good. If the philosophers, having
been exposed to private property, can become corrupted even when they initially
understand its valuelessness, it should be even more obvious that the philosophers,
knowing (on our supposition) that ruling is an intrinsic good, can become corrupted
by political power once they start to exercise it.
Irwin19 has suggested that the philosophers do not sacrifice their own interest in
agreeing to rule, and that it is not qua helping other people, as Thrasymachus held,
that the philosophers will regard justice as burdensome. It is qua administrative tasks,
planning for war, and so on, that the just actions involved in ruling are seen as worth
avoiding. But to prove that justice pays in the present case it is enough for Plato to
show that, qua doing what is just, ruling is worth choosing for itself.
But it will not be enough. For to allow that qua ruling the action is an intrinsic evil
would concede to the many all that they claim. Glaucon did not argue that qua doing
what is just an action is evil in itself and qua (for example) handing money over to
another person it is good in itself or indifferent; nor that qua stealing and getting one’s
hands on another’s goods an action is evil or indifferent and qua doing what is unjust it
is good in itself. Rather just action is regarded as evil in so far as it is a matter of
handing money over to other people, and unjust action is in my self-interest in so far
as it is a matter of getting my hands on another’s goods. It is because of the specific
18 So I cannot agree with Christopher Bobonich that ‘Plato in the Republic shows little concern
that philosophers might be seducedby thepleasures of thelower parts of thesoul’(Plato’s Utopia
Recast [Oxford, 2002], 353; cf. 369–70). Rather, this concern is the primary reason for one of the
most distinctive features of the constitution of the Republic.
19 Irwin (n. 11), 300–1.
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the specific content of the just action that it is supposed to be contrary to my
self-interest. The position is that when—as it typically is in the view of the
many—doing what is just is realized in the performance of an action which involves
the agent securing an evil or losing some good, then doing what is just is against the
agent’s self-interest. There is no reason to think that the many favour injustice or have
any objections to justice when it is just for them to assign more goods to themselves
than to others.
III. JUSTICE PAYS NOBODY
It is generally agreed that a difficulty about whether justice pays arises for Plato solely
in the case of the philosopher-ruler. But, in fact, the explanation of why justice does
not pay the philosopher applies to every other working citizen in the polis: when
justice is a matter of the performance of one’s specific task, justice pays nobody in the
city. In the case of the philosopher, the just action of ruling does not pay because
ruling is an intrinsic evil. But Plato regards every other form of work in the city as an
even greater evil. I am not sure that what I am about to say about other forms of work
would be thought by Plato to apply to farmers or the work of the auxiliaries. But
since the main function of the auxiliaries is waging war (543a), it is plausible to say
that the performance of their work is not an intrinsic good for them.
To see this, consider first Plato’s attitude to the value of the kinds of  jobs that
members of the producing class will engage in. The jobs performed by producers
include carpentry, pottery, housebuilding, farming, weaving, making agricultural tools,
cobbling, and the work performed by shepherds, merchants, sailors, retailers,
metalworkers, and rowers in triremes—in general, manual labour or any other way of
making money.20 For all of these citizens, when they carry out their assigned tasks,
they are doing what is just.21
But a number of remarks show that Plato regards such forms of work as mean,
debasing activities which are evil in themselves and damaging to their practitioners. I
will assume that what Plato says about these jobsappliesto other jobsof theproducing
class.
1. The practice of medicine and other ways of making money are assigned to the
third class of goods (357c). They are said to be laborious but good for their
consequences because they are rewarded by pay (357c7–d2). Since any member
of Plato’s third class of goods is an intrinsic evil,22 this means that all forms of
work done in order to make money are regarded as evil in themselves. For
example, at 371e Plato refers to wage earners such as shoemakers who receive
payment for heavy labour.
20 Resp. 370c–e, 396a–b, 406d, 407b, 420e–421a, 428c–d, 434a, 443c, 454c, 467a, 468a, 547d.
21 The conflict between justice and self-interest arises in the case of  the philosophers only
because it is just for them to do their work. At 519e–520a, speaking of the philosophers, Plato
says that ‘the law has not made men of this kind in the city in order to allow each to turn in any
direction they wish but to make use of them to bind the city together’(cf. 395b–c). But what holds
for the philosophers holds for the other citizens as well. Unlike in democracies (557b, 557e–558a),
the law in the ideal city no more allows the rest of the citizens than it allows the philosophers to
‘turn in any direction they wish’ (421b–c, 423d). Since the laws in Plato’s ideal city are just, and
the law demands that each citizen perform his or her proper work, a citizen’s performance of such
work is just.
22 See n. 2 above.
388 R. HEINAMAN2. The structure of Plato’s city, as of the original city described in Book II, is that
all engage in some specific form of work to provide a good which will benefit
others, and in return receive the benefits provided by the work done by others.
Thus, everyone both gives and receives (369c). The giving—that is, the benefiting
of others and not of oneself—lies in doing one’s job. This is what the
philosophers do in ruling, and it is also what all in the justly ordered polis do in
performing their various jobs. This does not entail that work is evil in itself but it
certainly suggests that work does not directly benefit the agent and, therefore, is
not good in itself for the agent. At 347d a clear contrast is drawn between
benefiting oneself and benefiting others in the performance of one’s job.
3. Socrates argues at length (345d–347e) that true rulers do not benefit from ruling,
regard it as of no benefit to themselves, and therefore do it unwillingly. To prove
this point he appeals to an analogy with the crafts, and says that the exercise of
a craft benefits its subject but is of no benefit to the agent.
If payment is not added, is the craftsman benefited by his craft?
It appears not. (346d6–8)
The man who intends to practise his craft well never does what is best for himself.
(347a1–2; cf. 345e5–7)
23
The argument takes it for granted that the work of a craftsman does not benefit the
craftsman, and then claims that the same applies to the case of ruling. If so, the
craftsman’s work cannot be good in itself for the craftsman.
4. As the many consider justice a π ξοΚ, and the philosophers regard ruling as a
π ξοΚ, so the work of all in the polis is called a π ξοΚ, a laborious task (357c,
371e, 519d, 520b, d).
5. The crafts are rightly despised (496b; cf. 466a–b), they are all mean or base
(β0ξαφτοι) (522b).24 Mechanical work with one’s hands is to be reproached
because it indicates that reason in the labourer’s soul ‘is naturally weak and
cannot rule the animals within but pampers them and can learn nothing except
ways to flatter them’ (590c).
This last statement immediately follows Plato’s argument that unjust action is evil for
the agent because it ‘enslaves the most divine part’ of the agent to ‘the most ungodly
and disgusting part’ (589e). He then condemns licentious behaviour, softness, and the
pursuit of  money because they promote the subordination of reason to the lower
parts of the soul (590a–c), before going on to condemn mechanical work in the
quoted passage. It appears, therefore, that Plato regards mechanical work as having
an effect on the soul that is similar to the effect of unjust action.
This is confirmed by what Plato says at 495d–e where the adverse effects of a
craftsman’s work on body and soul is described in these terms: ‘their bodies are
debased by their crafts and services, and similarly their souls are crushed and
fragmented by the sordidness of their work’.
Plato’s belief in the evil effect of the producers’ work on their souls is further
confirmed in Book III where he says that those who are to become guardians and who
23 Whenever practising one’s craft is just, these statements directly contradict the main thesis of
the Republic: justice pays.
24 Cf. Resp. 405a, Chrm. 163b.
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(395d–396b): women ‘railing at a man or quarrelling with gods,...s l a v e s...
performing slavish tasks, . . . evil men,...c o w a r d s ,o rp e o p l el i b e l l i n ga n dr i d i c u l i n g
one another, using bad language whether drunk or sober, . . . madmen . . . neighing
horses or bellowing bulls . . .’. Plato fears that individuals who imitate such people or
animals may become corrupted in one way or another. But I have omitted another
category from Plato’s list: to his assortment of madmen, neighing horses, bellowing
bulls, and slaves, Plato adds ‘metal workers or other craftsmen, or those who row in
triremes’ (396a–b). Evidently, this sort of work has a corrupting influence on the soul
since mere imitation of it can corrupt the soul.
The same view is found in the Laws. There (846d, 918d–920a,c), the citizens are
farm owners barred from engaging in any handicraft or retail trade because such
work fosters an excessive love of money.25 The undesirable effect of manual labour
on the soul is also described in an earlier passage (Leg. 741e): ‘you know how a
freeman’s character is coarsened by manual labour, which is generally admitted to be
degrading’.26
Since it is unjust action’s promotion of the subordination of reason to the lower
parts of the soul which Plato offers in the Republic as the explanation of why unjust
action is evil in itself, it seems safe to conclude that the similar effect of mechanical
labour on the soul is taken by Plato to be a reason why labouring with one’s hands is
evil in itself.
It is true that there is one passage which can reasonably be taken to indicate that
Plato does not regard the work of the producers as utterly degrading. At 406–7 he
explains how medicine should be practised in a well-governed city, saying that a regular
labourer such as a carpenter should not be willing to undergo a lengthy and elaborate
treatment that would prevent him from doing his work for a long period of time. For
‘if he does not perform the task which is his, life is of no benefit to him’ (407a;
cf. 406d). This suggests that the labourer’s work is, in itself, of positive value to the
carpenter since Plato’s point is presumably not that the value in question consists in the
wages that would be the consequence of the work.
Nevertheless, this one passage cannot override the evidence just cited, and if it does
mean that work has intrinsic value, it does not save Plato from incoherence in his views
but rather adds to it. Forhe is then ascribing positive value to a form of activity that he
normally, and unambiguously, regards as an intrinsic evil. If Plato really is saying in
this passage that one’s work is what gives value to one’s life, the bare assertion is not
enough. He must explain how it can be a craftsman’s work that gives value to his life if,
as Plato holds, the work of a craftsman debases and degrades the craftsman. I do not
believe there could be any satisfactory explanation of such a position. The same thing
cannot both debase your life and give it so much value that life is not worth living
without it.
It is not clear that 406–7 can be made consistent with Plato’s reference to the
retirement of the philosophers at 498b–c. Of course, the philosophers will be able to
turn to contemplation in their retirement, whereas it is not clear that, in Plato’s
opinion, the rest of the population would have some meaningful activity to turn to if
they stopped working. But 407a–b may suggest that one can practise virtue even when
not engaged in some specific task. And at 498b–c Plato mentions the philosophers’
25 See G. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City (Princeton, 1960), 138, 143, 144. Cf. Leg. 705a, 831b–e,
835e–836a.
26 Based on Trevor Saunders’s translation: The Laws (London, 1975).
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service’. Failing physical powers should also be a reason for the auxiliaries to retire
from their line of work, nor is there any reason why it would not apply to many forms
of physical labour.
So it is far from clear that Plato thinks that the value of one’s work is so great that
there is no point in going on living after one can no longer engage in it. For he
evidently envisages people retiring without the necessities of life being denied to them.
And for the city to withhold such support would be unjust, given Plato’s argument as
to why it is just for the philosophers to agree to rule (520a–c). If it is just for the
philosophers to agree to confer the benefit of ruling on the city in repayment for the
education they received during a time when they were making no contribution to the
wellbeing of the city, it must also be just for the city to confer the benefit of material
support on retired workers during a time when they may be making no contribution to
thewellbeing of thecity, in repayment forthebenefits they conferredon thecity during
their years of work (cf. 568e8–9, Leg. 717b–c).
In any case, then, the preponderance of evidence shows that Plato regards manual
labour as evil in itself. If so, in this case of just action, it does not pay the producer to
do what is just.
It might be said that the fact that the philosophers have a valuable alternative to
ruling open to them whereas the other workers do not is of some relevance. For if
doing one’s job is the best alternative open to a worker, and if doing one’s job is just,
then doing what is just does secure the best life available to the worker. It then seems
reasonable to say that, for this and every other worker, justice pays: they thereby secure
the best life that is available to them.
But if it is granted that the particular job of a worker is the best activity that he or
she can engage in, all that follows is that it is the least of the evils that are open to the
worker. Obviously, if all the options open to an agent are evils, it pays the agent to
select the least of those evils. But then it remains true that the worker is choosing what
is evil whereas Plato is required to demonstrate that justice is good in itself. This
requirement is not satisfied if justice is ‘good’ only in the sense that it is the least of
available evils.
Some think that the argument that justice pays is intended to prove solely that it
pays for the philosopher, Plato having no interest in the question in the case of the
working classes. If so, the present difficulty for the producers should not worry him.
But this view is certainly wrong. First, Plato’s conclusion (612b) is that he has shown
that the soul must do what is just whether one has the ring of  Gyges or not. His
conclusion therefore evidently applies to the non-philosopher with Gyges’ ring in
Glaucon’s argument in Book II.
Secondly, when Plato argues that unjust action does not pay he argues that it does
not pay ‘anyone’ (589d). And given his explanation of why just action pays and unjust
action does not pay (588b–591e), it is clear why this is so. Unjust action promotes
injustice in the soul, a great evil. Even if a producer cannot attain perfect justice, he is
plainly benefited by achieving the degree of justice27 that he can. Plato says that such a
person is benefited by having his life governed by an intellect that is not his own
(590c–d; cf. 431c–d). Plainly, that directing intellect will guide the producer to justice in
27 Presumably, this is what Plato refers to when he speaks of virtue acquired by habit without
philosophy (619c–d), and may be what he means by ‘popular virtue’ at 500d.
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benefited by being directed by a wise intellect.
Thirdly, in both of the passages where Plato turns his attention to behaviour and
argues that just action is good in itself and unjust action is evil in itself (443e–445b,
588b–591e), he says that the just man will act to preserve his inner harmony when
engaged in actions concerned with the acquisition and expenditure of wealth (443e,
589d–e). Since the philosopher in the ideal city will do no such thing,28 the point
evidently applies to non-philosophers. Likewise, when Plato completes his argument
for justice by pointing out its beneficial consequences, these consequences include the
just man’s (a) filling public office if he wishes, (b) marrying into whatever family he
desires, and (c) giving his children in marriage to whomever he wishes (613d; cf. 362b,
363a). Plato could not describe the philosopher-kings with (a), and (b) and (c) are
denied to the philosopher-kings in Plato’s ideal state. So these beneficial consequences
of justice are evidently envisaged as applying to people outside of the ideal state and
other than the philosopher-kings. Therefore, it cannot be that the dialogue’s argument,
of which this is the concluding part, was merely purporting to show that it pays the
philosopher-kings (only) to be just.29
Fourthly, in the myth of Er, after death, those who during their lives on earth had
‘virtue through habit and without philosophy’—that is, non-philosophers—receive the
reward of ascending the heavenly way rather than the punishment of descending the
‘lower way’ (614c, 619c–d).30 Evidently Plato’s argument that justice pays applies to
them as well as to philosophers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plato’s defence of justice in the Republic is seriously flawed. His overriding aim is to
show that justice pays. Part of what he must show to prove this is that just action pays
the just agent. And in order to show this he must demonstrate that just behaviour is
good in itself. Plato regards a citizen’s performance of his or her work as a prime
example of doing what is just. Thus, it is just for the philosophers to rule. But far
28 It is plain that, at the very least, Plato is not thinking exclusively of public officials acquiring
and spending money on behalf of the state.
29 Christopher Bobonich ([n. 18], 54; cf. 185–94) is surprised that, in the Republic, Plato does
not affirm that anything is good for a person only if that person has wisdom and knowledge of
the good: this ‘Dependency Thesis would provide strong support for the Republic’s claim that just
people are always better off than unjust people’. But the assertion of the Dependency Thesis
would ruin Plato’s claim that just action pays ‘anyone’. For it would mean that, for anyone
without wisdom, just action could not be an intrinsic good. But when Plato argues that justice
pays, he is, of course, arguing against the claim of the many that justice is not a good but an evil
for them.
30 Bobonich notes that in the myth of Er (614a–621d), at the end of the thousand-year period
when souls choose their future lives after emerging from the ‘heavenly’ and ‘lower’ ways, the
following happens: those who have travelled the heavenly way but possess only non-philosophical
virtue choose most of the available evil lives that will, after those lives are lived, lead to the
chooser’s suffering the punishments of the lower way; while those who have just travelled the
lower way will choose most of the good lives. Bobonich concludes that those who possess merely
non-philosophical virtue enjoy no ‘long-run benefit’([n. 18], 57, 476).
This conclusion should be rejected. Suppose a man achieves only non-philosophical virtue for
half of his earthly lives. Because of the virtue exhibited in those lives, he gains the long-term
benefits of enjoying the delights of the heavenly way and avoiding the punishments of the lower
way for half rather than none of those thousand-year intervals between earthly lives.
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then, justice does not pay.
Furthermore, the greater evil of lower forms of work shows even more clearly that
the work engaged in by the producers of Plato’s ideal city is intrinsically evil. Since the
intrinsic evil of ruling establishes that it is not in the self-interest of the philosophers to
rule, the greater intrinsic evil of lower forms of work likewise establishes that those
forms of work are not in the self-interest of the producers. Hence, for at least most
citizens in the polis, in the essential case of performing one’s job, Plato is committed to
saying that justice does not pay, contrary to the main thesis of the dialogue.31
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